



ACQUISITION

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

April 26, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR GOOBY

SUBJECT: Ukrainian Experts Visit

This memorandum summarizes the visit of the Ukrainian Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle (SNDV) Dismantlement Technical Experts to the United States from April 17-24, 1993.

The Ukrainian team arrived in Washington D.C. on Saturday, April 17th. The team was composed of four experts: Mr. Sokol (Ministry of Defense Conversion), Mr. Zdanov (Defense Conversion), Mr. Vinter (Ministry of Defense), and Mr. Lashkevitch (Academy of Sciences). LtCol Ovcharenko (Defense), the normal head of the working group, was expected but did not make the trip. Sokol, the acting leader, reported that Ovcharenko fell ill on the evening before the scheduled departure and could not travel. During the week, he subsequently told me confidentially that Ovcharenko did not receive permission to travel. Neither he nor the other representative of the Defense Ministry (Vinter) received clearance to come to the U.S., and the Ukrainian team did not know if this was caused by an oversight or for some malicious reason. Vinter traveled without permission and expressed some concern for his status upon return.

The U.S. side took our guests sightseeing on April 18th, and representatives of OSD, JCS, DNA, and the IC traveled across the country on the following schedule:

- April 19 Briefings at DNA on the U.S. competitive bid procurement process and what we do to convert closing military bases to other uses
- April 20 Tour at the Cedar Chemical Company (Vicksburg, MS) including observation of nitrogen tetroxide storage tanks, tanker railcar, tanker truck, emergency response escort vehicles, and various emergency and communications equipment
- April 21 Tour at the Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant (Marshall, TX) including a tour of the static fire facilities used during elimination of the Pershing system during INF, and a briefing on what the U.S. would do to static fire 46 SS-24s

- April 22 Tour at the Tooele Army Depot (Tooele, UT) including a tour of three incinerators of the type which could be used to incinerate Ukrainian heptyl

We escorted the Ukrainian team to Dulles Airport for their departure on Saturday, April 24th.

Items of interest from various portions of the trip follow.

Ukrainian elimination plan. Mr. Lashkevich briefly showed me the Ukrainian plan for elimination, which appeared to be 20-25 pages in length and was counter-signed by 12-15 ministries. It includes cost data, schedules, manpower requirements, etc. Total cost of the program is set at \$2.589B, but includes the costs of the "social guarantee" of jobs and housing for displaced personnel. Costs include their estimates of value for equipment the U.S. will provide and are further inflated by the fact that all manpower is priced at U.S. labor rates rather than Ukrainian – and manpower costs account for one-third of the total cost. Their rationale for this is the plan must be tied to a hard currency to be "realistic". When asked whether the plan called for the elimination of all 176 silos, the Ukrainians were evasive and stated it depended on the Rada.

Near-term elimination activity. The Ukrainians indicate that the MoD budget does include funds for elimination, and \$500M rubles was expended in 1992. Mr. Lashkevich (Academy of Sciences) will be involved in monitoring these funds to insure MoD is using them for elimination activities. They plan to begin the elimination process for 20 SS-19s during 1993, and will require 10 heptyl and 26 amyl tanker railcars to transport/store the associated propellant. The Ukrainians state the need for near-term solutions for their railcar needs and the facility upgrade at Dnepropetrovsk to handle this first step in the elimination process.

Plea for help with members of the Rada. The Ukrainian team asked for U.S. help with explaining the dismantlement task to members of their parliament. They claim there is very little appreciation for the technical requirements of the elimination plan in their legislative body. They also show signs of exasperation over American companies lobbying the Rada on subjects which confuse the issues at hand. For example, U.S. companies apparently market themselves as being able to eliminate the nuclear warheads on the ICBMs stationed on Ukrainian soil as an alternative to having them taken to Russia for dismantlement.

Ukrainian tanker railcar production. The Ukrainians estimate that the railcar production facility at Mariupol would require 2-3 months of preparation before being able to begin production of tanker railcars. It would take another 3-4 months to build the first railcar and the plant could produce up to 36 cars per year once production is in full swing. When asked about cost, Zdanov indicated the plant estimate, given just prior to their

departure, was \$100K for a heptyl car and \$260K for an amyl car. (FYI: initial U.S. cost estimate for cars designed and produced here are \$110K and \$140K respectively.) I responded that these costs were much too high to allow favorable consideration of Ukrainian production in the competitive bid process. The Ukrainians promised to reevaluate their cost data.

Ukrainian tanker railcar requirements. There remains some confusion on total requirements for railcars. The Ukrainians continue to state the need for 37 heptyl cars and some number of amyl cars below 40. But they would not confirm the information provided in February about 38 heptyl cars already existing in Ukraine. Finally, for the first time the Ukrainians told us they already have an additional 3,000MT of heptyl in storage, with capacity for another 500MT.

Ukrainian plans for heptyl. The Ukrainians remain committed to finding uses for their excess heptyl. They noted plans to use some for space launch purposes (4-7 flights per year anticipated) and are just getting initial results from their scientists on alternate uses, such as for pesticides, paint hardener, anti-corrosives, etc.

Solid rocket motor static fire. The Ukrainians admitted they have significant static fire facilities in their country, but discussed technical problems with the process for the SS-24. The second stage is different in design from U.S. missiles and offers a technical challenge for static firing. While we assume some technical solution was achieved during design and testing, the Ukrainian team was very apprehensive about a static fire solution to their SS-24 problem.

Summary: Although we were disappointed about LtCol Ovcharenko's absence, the U.S. team felt the trip was very successful. The Ukrainians were overwhelmed by our hospitality, the beauty of our country, our openness, and our willingness to provide information. We stressed the need for them to return and pass these impressions on to their respective ministries and the Rada. The experts are convinced of our desire to provide assistance, but they voice concern over the state of "politics" in Ukraine.



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NOTE:

Mike:

Attached is a memo for the boss on last week's visit. It'll give you guys something to read on the flight to Minsk. Travel safe.

*Cheers,
Rock*

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